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doned long ago. An exception to the direct-tax rules is 
irrelevant if the rules themselves are merely historical 
curiosities. 9 
Direct taxes other than 'taxes on 
incomes' must be apportioned. If an 
unapportioned direct-consumption tax 
is direct and isn't a 'tax on incomes,' it 
would be unconstitutional. 
For now, I put aside that issue in order to focus on 
the meaning of "taxes on incomes." We can't discuss 
every interpretational issue simultaneously; please in-
dulge me in Assumption Number 1. 
Assumption Number 2: I assume a direct-consump-
tion tax, like the flat tax or the USA tax, which would 
operate on individuals very much like a traditional 
income tax but which would reach only the consump-
tion component of income, is a direct tax. Although 
debatable, this also isn't an unfounded assumption. 
Such a tax is a direct tax for many of the same reasons 
that the tax at issue in the Income Tax Cases was direct: 
it's a tax imposed directly on individuals and isn't 
presumptively shiftable like a classic indirect tax on 
articles of consumption.10 The Sixteenth Amendment 
dealt with the practical consequences of the Income Tax 
Cases, but no judicial authority has explicitly 
repudiated the meaning of "direct taxes" that can be 
derived from those cases and from a study of the 
original understanding of the direct-tax clauses.11 
With those assumptions, the Sixteenth Amendment 
issue takes center stage. Direct taxes other than "taxes 
on incomes" must be apportioned. If an unapportioned 
direct-consumption tax is direct and isn't a it tax on 
incomes," it would be unconstitutional. 
Why a Consumption Tax Isn't a Tax on Incomes Under 
the Sixteenth Amendment 
We've all grown up assuming that the Constitution 
imposes no serious limitations on the congressional 
taxing power, and it's therefore hard to take seriously 
any constitutional language that seems to put limits on 
that power. (I venture to guess that few even know that 
there's limiting language in the Constitution.) But, as 
tax professionals, we don't ordinarily disregard 
statutory language that's inconvenient. And we should 
9See Calvin H. Johnson, "Apportionment of Direct Taxes: 
The Foul-Up in the Center of the Constitution," 7 Wm. & Mary 
Bill of Rts. f. 1 (1998); cf. Ackerman, supra note 3. Ackerman 
argues that the apportionment rule was originally limited to 
real-estate and capitation taxes. And he goes on to argue that, 
because of "social justice," the "American People," and the 
New Deal Revolutiou, the Sixteenth Amendment also 
shouldn't be interpreted as a limitation on the taxing power. 
10See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2407-08. Calvin Johnson 
thinks that the original understanding of "direct taxes" was · 
even broader than my definition. See Johnson, supra note 9. 
11I recognize that the issue isn't likely to come before the 
Supreme Court, given the Sixteenth Amendment, and that 
one therefore shouldn't read too much into the Court's 
silence on the meaning of "direct taxes." 
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show at least as much respect for constitutional text as 
we do for language in the Internal Revenue Code.12 
To be sure, in form the Sixteenth Amendment isn't 
a limiting provision. Quite the contrary. Not long after 
the Supreme Court in the Income Tax Cases struck down 
an income tax on the groUn.d that it was an unappor-
tioned direct tax, the Sixteenth Amendment was ap-
proved by Congress and ratified by the states -
ratification was certified in 1913 - to permit such a 
tax. The Amendment makes clear that "taxes on in-
comes" needn't be apportioned, and that's an expan-
sion of the taxing power as understood after the Income 
Tax Cases. 
But in form it's not an unlimited expansion. The 
amendment was a response to the Income Tax Cases, and 
it's only "taxes on incomes" that the Amendment 
removes from the apportionment requirement. A direct 
tax that isn't a tax on incomes must be apportioned to 
be valid. It has become the conventional wisdom that 
a "tax on incomes" is whatever Congress says it is, or 
whatever we want it to be. In Daniel Shaviro' s words, 
"[I]t is generally agreed that the [Sixteenth] Amend-
ment does not significantly constrain how taxable in-
come can be defined by Congress and the courts."13 I 
challenge the conventional wisdom. 
Here are a couple of samples of the conventional 
wisdom, drawn from works by important writers on 
taxation. Both samples contain language that is consis-
tent with common understanding, and that elegantly 
make the points I want to rebut. 
Victor Thuronyi argues that, "[b ]ecause people have . ~. 
different views of tax equity, there is no 'true' concept 
of income."14 Instead, the concept "is by its nature high-
ly practical, flexible and ad hoc,"15 and that has con-
stitutional implications: 
[T]he Constitution allows Congress to provide for 
the common defense. Can a congressional fund-
ing of a missile be challenged on the basis that, 
in fact, the missile ... decreases our security? 
Apart from standing concerns, such a challenge 
surely would be summarily rejected by the courts 
on the basis that the common defense is an in-
herently malleable term the meaning of which 
must be left to the judgment of Congress. The 
12For that reason, I am shocked - shocked! - to see 
Professor Kahn question the proposition that "Congress can-
not tax as income an item that does not fall within the mean-
ing of 'income' as that term is used in the Sixteenth 
Amendment." Douglas A. Kahn, "The Constitutionality of 
Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental Distress When 
There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury," 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 
128, 130 (1999). 
13Daniel N. Shaviro, "Psychic Income Revisited: Response 
to Professors Johnson and Dodge," 45 Tax L. Rev. 707,711 n.17 
(1990). 
14Victor Thuronyi, "The Concept of Income," 46 Tax L. Rev. 
45, 53 (1990) (footnote omitted). "Under the terms of the 
definition, income could mean the same thing as consump-
tion or wealth, or something else, depending on the criteria 
we use for determining tax equity." Id. at 54 (footnote 
omitted). 
15Id. at 61. 
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same should apply to the meaning of income in 
the [S]ixteenth [A]mendment.16 
And Professor Marjorie Kornhauser seems to agree 
that "incomes" is an inherently malleable term. Con-
gress must therefore provide meaning for an otherwise 
amorphous concept: 
[T]he Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a 
fully vested power to tax all income, however Con-
gress defines it, without worrying about fine dis-
tinctions. Such an interpretation yields a meaning 
of income that is broad and evolutionary. Income's 
meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the 
Court, and that meaning changes over time as con-
gressional conceptions of income change and be-
come more sophisticated.17 
I've no doubt that almost all tax practitioners and tax 
teachers, if they think about the matter at all, would 
accept those propositions. (Indeed, that most don't think 
about the matter is itself evidence that the propositions 
are accepted.) In the following discussion, I'll explain 
why the conventional wisdom isn't necessarily true, or, 
even if it's true, why it doesn't necessarily mean that a 
direct-consumption tax is a "tax on incomes." 
1. The nature of the constitution and 'inherent mal-
leability.' To begin with, the notion that the term "taxes 
on incomes" _is "inherently malleable" and therefore 
means whatever Congress says it means is inconsistent 
with the idea of the Constitution. Yes, the Constitution 
was intended to increase national power, to make a real 
national government possible. But, as we all know, the 
Constitution is full of limitations on national power-
it wouldn't have been ratified without limitations -
and we don't usually think of Congress as having the 
final say on matters of constitutional interpretation.18 
It would be peculiar to interpret a document that was 
intended, in part, to limit federal power as granting to 
Congress a nearly unlimited power to determine what 
those limits are.19 
If their intention was to remove all direct taxes from 
the apportionment requirement, the drafters of the Six-
teenth Amendment did a poor job indeed. Instead, it 
16Id. at 101. 
17Marjorie E. Kornhauser, "The Constitutional Meaning of 
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts," 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 
24 (1992). 
18Congress has a say, and congressmen should feel 
obligated to consider the constitutionality of proposed legis-
lation. But we don't usually think of Congress's having the 
only say. 
19The fact that the Sixteenth Amendment was added later 
doesn't change the nature of the Constitution. The Amend-
ment had a limited purpose, to overturn the narrow holding 
of the Income Tax Cases; it shouldn't be interpreted as having 
repealed other constitutional values. As Judge Kozinski and 
Professor Volokh state, 
The notion that every constitutional amendment is a 
partial repeal of every previously-enacted constitution-
al provision has hair-raising implications. Does the Six-
teenth Amendment ... authorize a tax levied only on 
income derived from sale of antigovernment literature, 
or a tax only on blacks?. Does it allow collection tech-
niques that violate the Fourth Amendment? 
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, "A Penumbra Too Far," 106 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1638, 1650 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
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was only "taxes on incomes" that were exempted. That 
term may not have a precisely defined set of boun-
daries - what constitutional terms do? - but that 
doesn't mean that the term becomes an empty vessel 
into which Congress can pour whatever definition it 
wishes. 
It may well be the case that, as Joseph Isenbergh has 
put it, the "Framers [of the Sixteenth Amendment] ... 
rarely worked on the entire canvas at one time," and, 
as a result, they "may not themselves always have 
understood the full import of the provisions they in-
troduced, and even less of the system overall."20 I don't 
necessarily agree that the confusion was so great, but 
suppose for the sake of argument it was. What inter-
pretational principles would follow from that assump-
tion? One could find similar confusion in the origin of 
many legal documents, including the Internal Revenue 
Code. Do constitutional and statutory provisions be-
come open-ended simply because they present difficult 
interpretational tasks?21 
It would be peculiar to interpret a 
document that was intended, in part, 
to limit federal power as granting to 
Congress a nearly unlimited power to 
determine what those limits are. 
In a pass~ge I quoted earlier, Victor Thuronyi is 
right, insome sense, when he argues that "[b]ecause 
people have different views of tax equity, there is no 
'true' concept of income."22 But that proposition 
doesn't transfer well into constitutional law, where 
concepts aren't ordinarily defined by agreement. There 
may be no clearly "true" concept of "unreasonable 
searches and seizures," but we can't therefore ignore 
that constitutional phrase. 
And Thuronyi's missile example doesn't hit the tar-
get.23 He's right that a constitutional challenge to 
deployment of a particular missile system would (and 
should) go nowhere in court. But that's a trivially easy 
case. Let's get closer to reality (or as close as we can 
after putting standing issues aside). Does Thuronyi 
mean to suggest that any expenditure would be con-
stitutionally acceptable simply because Congress 
declared it to be for national defense?24 The defense 
umbrella covers a lot, but does it really cover every-
thing - as long as Congress mumbles the word 
"defense" in its deliberations? If constitutional lan-
20Joseph Isenbergh, "The End of Income Taxation,"45 Tax 
L. Rev. 283, 287 (1990). 
21Hint: the right answer to that question is No. 
22Thuronyi, supra note 14, at 53. 
23See supra text accompanying note 16. 
24The practical answer may be Yes, but I want to examine 
the impractical interpretational issue: Should an expenditure 
that has no other authority to justify it be valid merely be-
cause Congress says the expenditure is being made for na-
tional defense? 
1091 
! ' i' 
guage is that malleable, then there are effectively no 
constitutional limitations on congressional power. 
In any event, that's not the sort of challenge that 
would be made to a direct-consumption tax. In ques-
tioning whether such a tax is really a tax on incomes, 
we wouldn't be doing the equivalent of second guess-
ing Congress's judgment about the military capabilities 
of something that is unquestionably a military weapon. 
We would be asking whether a purported weapon is 
really a weapon at all, whether a purported income tax 
is really a tax on incomes. In neither case should the 
answer be Yes just because Congress says it is. 
2. The income tax was a reaction to the perceived 
inadequacies of consumption taxes. Historically, con-
sumption taxes and income taxes weren't considered 
to be functional equivalents; that's one reason we 
should be skeptical that the Sixteenth Amendment 
term "taxes on incomes" would encompass a tax, like 
the flat tax or the USA tax, that picks up only the 
consumption component of income. 
Before the enactment of the 1894 income tax, which 
was struck down by the Supreme Court in the Income 
Tax Cases, there was a sense that the taxes that had 
funded the United States for most of the nation's his-
tory were unfair: the burdens were falling dispropor-
tionately on lower-income persons. That's why a new 
form of taxation was necessary,25 and, once the 
Supreme Court had repudiated the 1894 tax, the move 
to amend the Constitution began. Income taxes were 
different because they would reach a different tax base, 
and, as a result, fall more heavily on higher-income, 
wealthier Americans. In Michael Graetz's words, 
"More than eighty years ago when this nation adopted 
the Sixteenth Amendment, achieving fairness in the 
distribution of the tax burden was the essential'reason 
for taxing income and for taxing it at progressive 
rates."26 
I haven't done as much research as I need to on the 
income tax debates in the 1890-1913 period, but this 
much I'm sure about: commentators then and now 
generally see the late nineteenth-, early twentieth-cen-
tury proponents of an income tax as trying to reorient 
the tax system.27 As historian Gerald Eggert put it, 
Congressional debates made it clear ... that the 
[1894 income] tax was, in part, a response to the 
widespread demand to equalize the tax burdens 
borne by the various classes. The tariff, which 
was the federal government's chief source of 
revenue, lay most heavily on the poorer classes 
25The income tax wasn't an entirely new idea; one had 
been used during the Civil War. But it wasn't until enactment 
of the 1894 income tax that many people contemplated an 
income tax as a permanent part of the revenue system. 
26Michael J. Graetz, The Decline [and Fall?] of the Income Tax 
222 (1997). 
270ne significant exception is Robert Stanley, Dimensions 
of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the Federal Income Tax, 
1861-1913 (1993) (characterizing enactment of income tax as 
means of cutting off far-reaching reform). 
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-ran the argument- while the proposed in-
come tax would be paid by the wealthier classes. 28 
Edward Whitney (Assistant Attorney General at the 
time of the Income Tax Cases) explained the 1894 tax in 
this way: "The party controlling, the House of Repre-
sentatives, accepting the -theory that the prevailing 
taxes on consumption bore especially hard on the 
smaller incomes, undertook to make up the deficit with 
a compensatory duty upon the larger ones."29 
The Sixteenth Amendment isn't 
authority for a consumption tax; 
indeed, it was the perceived failure of 
consumption taxes that made the 
income tax - and hence the Sixteenth 
Amendment - necessary. 
When the 1894 income tax was struck down, a push 
for a constitutional amendment was inevitable. The 
Sixteenth Amendment was intended to constitutionally 
validate what income-tax proponents had attempted to 
do in 1894. In defending today's income tax against 
flat-tax supporters, Michael Graetz makes this basic 
point about the Amendment: "A flat-rate tax on con-
sumption would shift substantial amounts of taxes 
from higher- to lower-income families .... [T]he 
American people will not accept such a tax as fair. 
Indeed, the Sixteenth Amendment was added to the 
Constitution to redress such a situation."30 
In short, the Sixteenth Amendment isn't authority 
for a consumption tax; indeed, it was the perceived 
failure of consumption taxes that made the income tax 
- and hence the Sixteenth Amendment - necessary. 
3. Direct-consumption taxes aren't what is meant by 
'taxes on incomes' today. The understanding that in-
come taxes and consumption taxes are different 
animals continues today. The current proponents of 
consumption taxes aren't modest in their public 
pronouncements. Taxes like the flat tax or the USA tax 
would, it's plausibly argued, dramatically change the 
American tax system. The goal of the consumption tax 
proponents, according to House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Chair Bill Archer, is to "pull the income tax out 
by its roots and throw it away."31 That doesn't sound 
like income tax talk to me. 
28Gerald G. Eggert, "Richard Olney and the Income Tax 
Cases," 48 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 24, 24-25 (1961). 
29Edward B. Whitney, "The Income Tax and the Constitu-
tion," 20 Harv. L. Rev. 280, 284 (1907). 
30Graetz, supra note 26, at 262. "The fear of ... backlashes 
... is at least part of the reason why consumption tax 
proponents in Congress have cloaked their proposals in in-
come tax garb." Id. at 263; see also Michael J. Graetz & Michael 
M. O'Hear, "The 'Original Intent' of U.S. International Taxa-
tion," 46 Duke L.J. 1021, 1043 (1997) ("The Sixteenth Amend-
ment permitting a federal income tax had ... been sold to the 
American people on fairness grounds .... "). 
31Quoted in John Godfrey," Archer Keen on Killing Code, 
Full Speed Ahead on Tax Reform," Tax Notes, Mar. 11, 1996, 
p. 1431. 
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Nevertheless, critics have suggested to me that the 
,, difference between a direct-consumption tax and an 
\income tax is just a matter of accounting (that is, 
/whether taxpayers should be entitled to deductions or 
exclusions to reflect savings), and accounting .issues 
don't rise to constitutional levels. Moreover, it's pos-
sible to pick passages out of Supreme: Court opinions 
to support that position. For example, the Court wrote 
in 1934, "Unquestionably Congress has the power to 
condition, limit or deny deductions from gross income 
in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax."32 
If we were talking about an isolated deduction or 
exclusion, I'd agree that the Constitution is likely to be 
irrelevant: determining one's entitlement to most 
deductions or exclusions doesn'trequire constitutional 
analysis.33 But this is different: exempting the savings 
component of income from taxation would fundamen- . 
32Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co, 292 U.S. 371, 381 
(1934). 
33But I don't mean to say that the current code is the 
standard by which constitutionality of tax legislation should 
be measured, and I reject the idea that anything hidden in 
the code under the heading "Income Taxes" is necessarily 
constitutional. An unapportioned tax on real estate wouldn't 
become constitutional merely because Congress put it into 
subtitle A of the code. See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. 
Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) ("If the statute lays taxes on the 
part of the building occupied by the owner or upon the rental 
value of that space, it cannot be sustained, for that would be 
to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment."). 
Some cases that could be interpreted~as taking a cavalier 
position on the meaning of income or as standing for the 
proposition that accounting is all-powerful, like Burnet v. 
Sanford & Broqks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), do nothing of the 
sort. Yes, the Court deferred to the system of annual account-
ing in a case where, over time, the taxpayer had little or no 
net income; the result, therefore, was that an "income" tax 
was imposed on a person without economic income. But the 
case merely held that allowances must be made for account-
ing practicality, as thatpracticality was understood in 1913, 
when the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified: 
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it 
should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to 
the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a 
system is it practicable to produce a regular flow of 
income and apply methods of accounting, assessment, 
and collection capable of practical operation. It is not 
suggested that there has ever been any general scheme 
for taxing income on any other basis. The computation 
of income annually as the net result of all transactions 
within the year was a familiar practice, and taxes upon 
income so arrived at were not unknown, before the 
Sixteenth Amendment. ... It is not to be supposed that 
the amendment did not contemplate that Congress 
might make income so ascertained the basis of a 
scheme of taxation such as had been in a~:tual operation 
within the United States before its adoption. While, 
conceivably, a different system might be devised ... , 
Congress is not required by the amendment to adopt 
such a system in preference to the more familiar 
method, even if it were practicable. 
Id. at 365. 
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tally change our conception of what income is.34 The 
Sixteenth Amendment didn't constitutionalize the 
Haig-Simons definition of income, of course, and a tax 
needn't reach all increases in wealth to constitute a 
valid income tax.35 But exempting savings is different 
from the selective exclusion of certain income items in 
today's code. The exclusion of broad categories of in-
come items - of what everyone concedes can be in-
cluded in "incomes" constitutionally - may leave a 
tax base that isn't income in any generally accepted 
sense.36 
The economic literature can't be controlling in inter-
preting a constitutional provision, but it's instructive 
to see how economists have promoted the flat tax and 
the USA tax: by emphasizing how different those taxes 
would be from the existing scheme. 37 As the terms are 
ordinarily used in the literature, an income tax is the 
opposite of a consumption tax. 38 At least since the time 
of Irving Fisher, consumption tax advocates have com-
plained about an income tax's being imposed both on 
the receipt of capital and on the income generated by 
the capital.39 In contrast, a pure consumption tax 
avoids double taxation, either by exempting the capi-
tal, or by exempting income from the capital, from 
tax.40 
34And, as I've already suggested, it would be inconsistent 
with the conception in 1913 - and that's significant. See 
Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) 
(focusing on "the commonly understood meaning of the term 
which must have been in the minds of the people when they 
adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution"). 
35If Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), is still good 
law, as about three people in the world (including me) think, 
an income tax couldn't reach all appreciation in wealth. 
36It's been said to me that a gross receipts tax- a tax that 
permits no deductions, even for legitimate business expenses 
-may be a "tax on incomes," and there is lower court au-
thority for that proposition. See Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960). But taxing someone 
who has no net income (say receipts of $100,000 but also 
expenses of $100,000) under an "income" tax is absurd. (Note 
the reference to "net" in the text accompanying supra note 
32.) The goal of the Sixteenth Amendment was to reach 
higher-income, not no-income, persons. 
The difference between a gross receipts tax and an income 
tax isn't merely a matter of accounting. Permitting this 
deduction or that may be an accounting issue; deciding 
whether to permit any deductions at all is decidedly not a 
simple accounting question. Cf Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, 247 
U.S. 179, 185 (1913) (concluding that basis or cost-of-goods-
sold concept was implicit in statutory definition of "income": 
"In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss, 
and the amount of the gain, if any, we must withdraw from 
the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital 
value that existed at the commencement of the period under 
consideration."). 
37See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2411-13. 
38I hate to admit it, but I'm indebted to Calvin Johnson for 
these points. He's really not a bad guy. 
39Irving Fisher & Herbert W. Fisher, Constructive Income 
Taxation: A Proposal for Reform 56-57 (1942). 
. 
40Professor Fisher and, more recently, Professor Jeff Strnad 
have argued that a true income tax wouldn't impose a double 
tax on capital. See id.; Jeff Strnad, "Taxation of Income From 
Capital: A Theoretical Appraisal," 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1023 (1985). 
(Footnote 40 continued on next page.) 
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Despite its hybrid status, our current "income" tax 
satisfies the double-tax criterion for an income tax. In-
deed, if the income tax didn't reach most sources of 
capital, it wouldn't have come into being. In contrast, 
the flat tax and the USA tax don't satisfy the double-tax 
criterion; that's part of their attraction. 
4. The Supreme Court for years didn't think the 
definition of 'incomes' was 'inherently malleable.' 
The idea that the term "taxes on incomes" is "inherent-
ly malleable" is a modern one. The Supreme Court 
clearly didn't accept that notion for a long time (and, 
for that matter, there's not much evidence that the 
Court has a position one way or the other on that issue 
today41). 
We all know Eisner v. Macomber,42 which held that 
shareholders couldn't be taxed on the receipt of totally 
proportionate stock dividends. In Macomber, in 1920, 
the Court stated that a 
proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very 
clear language, requires also that [the Sixteenth] 
Amendment shall not be extended by loose con-
struction, so as to repeal or modify, except as 
applied to income, those provisions of the Con-
stitution that require an apportionment according 
to population for direct taxes upon property, real 
and personal. This limitation still has an ap-
propriate and important function, and it is not to 
be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the 
courts.43 
And 
it becomes essential to distinguish between what 
is and what is not 'income,' as the term is used 
[in the Sixteenth Amendment]; and to apply the 
distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and 
substance, without regard to form. Congress' can-
not by any definition it may adopt conclude the 
matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Con-
stitution .... 44 
Clear enough? Macomber is rejected by most com-
mentators today, as if it were aberrational,45 but it isn't 
the only case in which the Court assumed that "in-
comes" had content. Consider, for example, the well-
known 1929 case of Taft v. Bowers,46 regarding the basis 
of property transferred by gift: "Under former 
decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth 
Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define 
and tax as income without apportionment something 
But those arguments haven't been generally accepted within 
the profession. See, e.g., Henry C. Simons, Personal Income 
Taxation 226 (1938) ("To an unsympathetic critic, Fisher's 
main point still seems to be that anything which is called an 
income tax ought to be a tax on what Fisher calls income."); 
Louis Kaplow & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., "Professor Strnad's 
Rejoinder: Simply Semantics," 39 Stan. L. Rev. 419, 419-25 
(1987). 
41! doubt that the issue grabs Supreme Court justices in 
the way it grabs me. 
42252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
43Id. at 206. 
44Id. 
45See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 3, at 42-46. 
46278 u.s. 470 (1929). 
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which theretofore could not have been properly 
regarded as income."47 
In Taft v. Bowers, the donee-taxpayer's position (that 
the income tax couldn't reach appreciation in property 
that had occurred while the property was held by the 
donor) didn't prevail, so .that the language about the 
restrictive nature of the Sixteenth Amendment could 
be viewed as dictum. But in the 1925 decision in Edwards 
v. Cuba Railroad Co.,48 the taxpayer, a railroad company, 
was successful in urging that it couldn't be taxed on 
subsidy payments made by the Cuban government: 
"The subsidy payments taxed were not made for ser-
vices rendered or to be rendered. They were not profits 
or gains from the use or operation of the railroad, and 
do not constitute income within the meaning of the 
Sixteenth Amendment."49 In short, they weren't the 
sort of benefit - if benefit they were - that people 
think of when they think of income, and "[t]he Six-
teenth Amendment, like other laws authorizing or im-
posing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be 
extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the 
language used."50 
I One doesn't necessarily have to have an all-encompassing theory of 'income' to decide whether a particular item is or isn't income. 
In 1921, in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka,51 
the Court had written that "in determining the defini-
tion of the word 'income' ... , this Court has consis-
tently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicog-
raphers or economists, and has approved, in the 
definitions quoted, what it believed to be the common-
ly understood meaning of the term which must have 
been in the minds of the people when they adopted the 
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."52 
That kind of language lends itself to ridicule by 
modern commentators. For example, the Third Circuit, 
in 1940, stated that the test relied on "some illusory 
theory that the state legislatures who ratified the 16th 
Amendment had some idea of an 'ordinary meaning' 
for such an economic abstraction."53 The Tax Court has 
been particularly unsympathetic to Sixteenth Amend-
ment claims. In 1978, for example, in rejecting a con-
47Id. at 481. 
48268 u.s. 628 (1925). 
49Id. at 633. 
50Id. at 631-32. 
51 255 U.S. 509 (1921) (upholding tax on capital gains). 
52Id. at 519; see also Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 
292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) ("The rental value of the building 
used by the owner does not constitute income within the 
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-
Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 173 (1926) ("It was not the purpose 
or effect of that Amendment to bring any new subject within 
the taxing power."). 
53Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 86, 87 (3d Cir. 
1940) (characterizing Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Smietanka). 
TAX NOTES, August 16, 1999 
stitutional challenge to section 83,54 the court referred 
to a "long-abandoned" Supreme Court effort to 
"fashion a concept of income."55 
The Court may not have considered the meaning of 
"income~" for a long time, but I'm not sure that the 
effort has actually been abandoned, 56 or if it was aban-
doned, what that means. One doesn't necessarily have 
to have a!'). all-encompassing theory of "income" to 
decide whether a particular item is or isn't income. 
That is, one doesn't need to be able to feel certain how 
all conceivable cases would be treated to rule on a 
particular case; that's the genius of the common law. 
My point in mentioning these old cases isn't to argue 
that the reasoning or results were necessarily right one-
by-one. I'm citing the cases for the proposition that the 
early understanding was that the Sixteenth Amend-
ment didn't grant unlimited power to Congress. The 
Court consistently rejected the idea that the meaning 
of the term "incomes" - in the words of Professors 
Cabinet and Coffey - ought "to float freely on the 
shifting tides of tax theologies."57 Despite all the dif-
ficulties that can arise in categorizing cases at the mar-
gin, I would be very surprised to have the Court today 
subscribe to the notion that Congress can define a con-
stitutional term however Congress wishes. 
5. It's not impossible to distinguish consumption 
and income taxes. It's true that the Supreme Court 
hasn't heard a lot of Sixteenth_Amendment cases 
recently, but that doesn't mean defining "incomes" is 
a hopeless project. This has unfortunately become a 
common method of legal argument: drawing lines is 
difficult, and, if a line is drawn, some cases at the 
margin may be wrongly decided. Moreover, we can 
always come up with difficult, marginal cases. There-
fore (the argument goes) meaningful distinctions can't 
be made at all. Because some people have trouble dis-
tinguishing Playboy and Penthouse for First Amend-
ment purposes, many wind up deciding that no legally 
meaningful lines can be drawn between The New York 
Times and Hustler. 
I'm not saying we should necessarily draft a rule 
that treats the Times and Hustler differently. I'm sug-
gesting only that the difficulty of making distinctions 
at the margin shouldn't blind us to our ability to dis-
tinguish quite different phenomena. 
That we might fight about whether a particular 
taxed item is really part of a "tax on incomes" doesn't 
mean that there are no important distinctions to be 
drawn between income taxes and consumption taxes. 
54The challenge was to the part of section 83 that defines 
the lapse of a restriction as a taxable event in some circum-
stances. 
55 Sakol v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986, 991, aff' d 57 4 F.2d 694, 
699, cert. denied 439 U.S. 859 (1978). 
56The Court still cites Macomber as if the case means some-
thing. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 
554, 563 (1991). 
57Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, "The Implications of 
the Economic Concept of' Income for Corporation-Share-
holder Income Tax Systems/' 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 895, 919 
(1977). 
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Those two types or taxes nave oeen 1:reateu a.1::1 .Lu.u-
damentally different in the United States for a long 
time, and the distinctions aren't ones that can be abol-
ished by congressional fiat. 
6. The assumption that Congress has unlimited 
power to define 'incomes' has been based on the as-
sumption that Congress would broaden the income 
tax base. To this point, I've been questioning the 
proposition that the term "incomes" is so inherently 
malleable that Congress can define the term however 
it wants. I'll now briefly shift gears. 
I would be very surprised to have the 
Court today subscribe to the notion 
that Congress can define a 
constitutional term however Congress 
wishes. 
Deference to Congress in characterizing a tax as an 
income tax isn't a principle I'm happy with, but you 
know what? It really doesn't matter with the direct-
consumption taxes we're talking about because Congress 
wouldn't purport to be defining the tax base as "incomes." 
Put another way: we don't need to defer to a congres-
sional definition of "incomes" if Congress doesn't say 
it's defining "incomes," or if Congress does say it's 
defining incomes but is engaging in a subterfuge. 
It's my impression that most commentators who 
have stressed how broad the congressional taxing 
power is have assumed that Congress would make a 
good-faith effort to define "incomes." That's true of 
Thuronyi and Kornhauser, the commentators I quoted 
on the "inherently malleable" point.58 Take away that 
assumption, and the case for deference disappears. 
Congress knows the flat tax and the USA tax aren't 
income taxes, or it will before a vote is taken. We'll 
make sure of that in our debates on these proposals. 
As a result, Congress shouldn't be able ,to rely on the 
Sixteenth Amendment as authority to enact a direct-
consumption tax. 
In addition, those who have argued that the term 
"taxes on incomes" is inherently malleable- or some-
thing similar- have assumed that Congress would act 
to broaden the definition of income. When Professor 
Kornhauser refers to a "broad and evolutionary" no-
tion of income- as "congressional conceptions of in-
come change and become more sophisticated"- she 
doesn't have in mind shrinking the tax base.59 She 
58See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
59 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. If nothing else, 
this discussion illustrates some of the peculiarities that arise 
from treating constitutional and legislative definitions of "in-
come" as if they necessarily coincide. What does it mean to 
say that Congress defines "incomes" under the Sixteenth 
Amendment? It can't be that Congress defines the constitu-
tional terms in a way that has effect on other governmental 
bodies or even on Congress itself. If Congress were to cut 
(Footnote 59 continued on next page.) 
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doesn't have in mind, that is, a tax like any of the 
proposed direct-consumption taxes. 
For example, in a number of articles, Professor 
Kornhauser sees "ability to pay" (particularly as 
reflected in a progressive rate structure) as a defining 
feature of the income tax: "[T]he graduated rate has 
been integrally connected under U.S. tax laws to the 
ability-to-pay theory that underlies the income tax."60 
[A] progressive rate structure has been a constant 
feature of the income tax since 1913, when the 
first income tax was enacted under the Sixteenth 
Amendment. At that time, most of the general 
public, politicians and economists accepted the 
idea of progressivity (though they disagreed as 
to the appropriate rates) because it conformed to 
their conception of 'ability to pay,' which was the 
basis of the income tax. 61 
And Victor Thuronyi has commented: 
An issue that has been important in the past, and 
may become important in the future if Congress 
becomes more creative with the income tax, is the 
definition of 'income' as used in the Sixteenth 
Amendment. ... [I]t may be appropriate to base 
. the definition of income for purposes of the Con-
stitution on tax equity. A constitutional definition 
of income in terms of tax equity would recognize 
that as long as Congress is striving to impose a tax 
based on the relative annual financial positions of 
taxpayers, according to its concept of fairness, the 
Court should not overturn its determinations. 62 
If Congress isn't trying to do that, it seems to me the 
inference from Kornhauser's and Thuronyi's discus-
sions is clear. 63 
back on the meaning of income, I can't believe that anyone 
would say that the narrow definition had constitutional 
status. Congress can't tie its own hands in the future by 
defining "incomes" narrowly today, or can it? 
60Marjorie E. Kornhauser, "The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax 
Reform Debate: An Example," 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2345, 2347 
(1996). 
61Marjorie E. Kornhauser, "What Do Women Want: 
Feminism and the Progressive Income Tax," 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 
151, 152 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
62Thuronyi, supra note 14, at 99-100 (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
630f course, one might argue that the term "taxes on in-
comes" has no content at all, and that the state of the law is 
such that, whatever the language of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, Congress can do whatever it wants. Professor Acker-
man has recently done just that: "Under the constitutional 
regime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant 
limits on the national government's taxing, spending, and 
regulatory power where the economy is concerned .... "Ack-
erman, supra note 3, at 3. And, with respect to the Sixteenth 
Amendment, he brushes aside the idea that we should try to 
figure out what "taxes on incomes" means: "When the People 
mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems particularly inap-
propriate for the Justices to respond in a niggling fashion." 
Id. at 55. In particular, Ackerman picks up on Holmes's dis-
sent in Eisner v. Macomber, to the effect that "[t]he known 
purpose of the [Sixteenth] Amendment was to get rid of nice 
questions as to what might be direct taxes." Macomber, 252 
(Footnote 63 continued in next column.) 
1096 
Conclusion 
"Income tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, 
is a tax on income. "64 
Those words of Lord Macnaghten, in London County 
Council v. Attorney-General, written in 1900, obviously 
can't be direct authority iR interpreting the meaning of 
the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. It's an English case, interpreting a passage 
from a century-old English revenue act. 65 But to my 
mind those words suggest the appropriate method of 
analysis in determining whether a tax is a "tax on 
incomes,'' and they suggest that not every levy is a tax 
on incomes. 
Policymakers who proceed as if there 
were no constitutional issues 
associated with direct-consumption 
taxes do so at their - and ultimately 
our- peril. 
I've presented some evidence that both historically 
and currently commentators have tended to think of 
income taxes and consumption taxes as fundamentally 
different. It is for that reason I question the generally 
held assumption that a consumption tax could be 
enacted, without apportionment, under the authority 
of the Sixteenth Amendment. 
Of course, this conclusion is only as good as the : 
assumptions that I made for purposes of this discus-
sion. If a direct-consumption tax isn't a direct tax, 
within the meaning of the Constitution, or if the direct-
tax apportionment rule is a dead letter, then any debate 
about the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is ir-
relevant to the consideration of direct-consumption 
taxes. 
U.S. at 219-20 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Ackerman, supra 
note 3, at 45; see also Kahn, supra note 12, at 139 (also approv-
ingly citing Holmes's dissent). Suffice it to say for present 
purposes that Ackerman's sweeping statements aren't based 
on constitutional text or structure; his interpretation of the 
Sixteenth Amendment makes sense only if we ignore the 
Amendment's language. Moreover, Justice Holmes cited no 
authority or evidence in support of his Macomber dissent. 
That fact reduces Professor Ackerman to making the bizarre 
argument that we should defer to Holmes because "we can 
never recapture the directness of his lived experience of the 
[Sixteenth Amendment's] ratification campaign." Ackerman, 
supra note 3, at 45; see also id. at 45-46 ("[WJe are left with 
Holmes's ipse dixits concerning original understanding 
certainly an important resource, but one that may be too 
easily dismissed by readers who have not themselves lived 
through the process of amendment ratification."). Why 
Holmes's "lived experience" during Sixteenth Amendment 
ratification was superior to the experiences of the Macomber 
Court's majority is never explained. 
64London Co. Council v. Attorney-General, [1901] A.C. 26, 35 
(H.L.) (Lord Macnaghten). 
65The language was "upon payment of any interest of 
money or annuities charged with income tax under Sched. D 
and not payable or not wholly payable out of profits or gains 
brought into charge to such tax." 
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But if direct-consumption taxes are direct taxes -
as I think they are - and if the apportionment rule still 
has effect - as I think it does - then the con-
'stitutionality of direct-consumption taxes hinges on 
the meaning of "taxes on incomes" in the Sixteenth 
Amendment. If nothing else, I hope I've shown why 
it's not self-evident that a direct-consumption tax is 
exempt from the apportionment requirement. 
Policymakers who proceed as if there were no constitu-
tional issues associated with direct-consumption taxes 
do so at their- and ultimately our- peril. 
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